On the Sense and Practicability of Ascribing Moral Responsibility to Corporations – Critical Analysis
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15678/ZNUEK.2016.0955.0706Keywords:
moral responsibility, group agency, stakeholder theory, corporate social responsibilityAbstract
The article seeks to determine if corporations can be expected to act in a morally responsible manner and what possible factors can make such a view sensible. In the article, I analyse three different views of corporate moral responsibility: first, that it is not possible; second, that such a responsibility is based on an appropriately understood conception of moral corporate subjectivity; and, third, that it is not necessary to acknowledge its moral subjectivity in order to assign moral responsibility to a corporation. I consider different types of argumentation, the implications regarding stakeholder theory and social expectations included in the concept of corporate social responsibility.
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